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Abstract 
This paper presents first a theoretical model of conflict between two agents 
characterized by a two-sector economy. In a contested sector two agents struggle to 
appropriate the maximum possible fraction of a contestable output. In an uncontested 
sector, they hold secure property rights over the production of some goods. Agents split 
their resource endowment between „butter‟, „guns‟ and „ice-cream‟. Eventually, 
tradable goods made of butter and ice-cream produced by conflicting parties are both 
sold to the Rest of the world. Therefore, the opportunity cost of conflict depends also on 
relative profitability of contested and uncontested production. In particular, 
productivity of uncontested production and profitability of contested sectors are 
countervailing forces. The empirical section focused on a panel of Sub-Saharan African 
countries for the period 1995-2006. Results are not fully conclusive. However, there is 
robust evidence that prices of manufactures (interpreted as the uncontested ice-cream) 
are negatively associated with the likelihood of a civil war. Eventually, international 
price of manufactures is also associated with a higher GDP per capita growth rate. The 
concluding remark seems to be that an increase in world prices of manufactures would 
make civil wars less likely.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The purpose of this paper is twofold. On one hand, this paper is intended to be an 
enrichment of theoretical economic analysis of conflicts. On the other hand, it is 
intended to enrich the empirical economic literature on civil wars in Sub-Saharan Africa 
by pointing out the relationship between commodities, manufacturing and outbreak of 
actual violent conflicts.  
The basic intuition underlying this work is that the opportunity cost of 
continuing conflicts depend upon a combination of (i) specific and persistent 
characteristics of agents involved; (ii) institutional features and (iii) external factors. For 
sake of clarity in what follows assume henceforth that agents involved can be 
considered indistinguishably as governments or warlords governing regions or countries 
respectively. In the eyes of an economist, it is simple to consider as „persistent 
characteristics‟ those related to the productive structure of economies which change 
only in the very long run. Secondly, by „institutional features‟, I mean the set of norms 
governing the evolution of economic life as well as the distribution of both income and 
power among agents. As „set of norms‟ the institutional features also favour the 
production of expectations about behaviour of agents considered. Needless to say, in the 
context of this work conflict is to be considered as a social norm in itself. Take a given 
point in time with no past behind. There are some positive initial endowments to be 
assigned to agents, and future distribution of income and power are eventually 
determined through conflict. More precisely, as social norm, the conflict is likely to 
produce reliable expectations on each agent‟s behaviour. This clearly does inform the 
pattern of interactions taking place. Thirdly, by „external factors‟ I clearly mean the set 
of factors which have to be assumed as exogenous to the economy considered as the 
structure of the market where goods and commodities are to be sold.  
 With this simple idea in mind, as noted above, this paper is firstly intended to 
complement a growing theoretical literature based upon the pioneering work of 
Hirshleifer (1988). In most of the existing literature, characteristics which fall within 
categories (i) and (ii) are frequently considered. Hence, this is work is intended to 
complement the existing literature by combining factors which fall in all categories (i), 
(ii) and (iii). Let me highlight the general framework of Hirshleifer-like models. In 
brief, at a given point in time, agents are endowed with some positive resources 
endowments and some technological capabilities for both productive and unproductive 
activities. Nevertheless, warring parties are interdependent because they are assumed to 
produce a joint output whose re-distribution is the casus belli. Intuitively the continuing 
conflict is the generalization of rent-seeking behaviours which do shape the social 
outcome of economies. As suggested by Baumol (1990) the ratio between rent-seeking 
and innovative and entrepreneurial activities determines the outcome as well as the 
dynamics of a society. In the presence of a conflict this impact is even more pervasive. 
In fact, conflict is not only dissipative but it is destructive in itself. Rent-seeking is 
dissipative and unproductive. Yet, actual conflicts in the eyes of an economist are 
destructive activities because societies are worse off not only because of the decreased 
level of productive activities but also because of the destruction of existing productive 
investments.  
 Recurring results of this established theoretical literature are: (a) in the presence 
of a large asymmetry in resource endowments, the poorer party will devote all its 
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endowment to guns. This has been labeled „the paradox of power‟ by Hirshleifer1; (b) 
cooperation between parties is feasible if and only if the relative advantage of one 
conflict technology over another is negligible. Yet, shifts in military technology can 
affect the economic incentives that may emerge in the presence of peaceful agreements; 
(c) there is an inverse relationship between productivity and willingness to be engaged 
in conflict. That is, the most productive agent in the production of butter is less willing 
to be involved in a bloody conflict for appropriation. The opportunity cost of conflict is 
higher in the presence of a superior productivity. This literature is surveyed in Garfinkel 
and Skaperdas (2007) 
2
.  
 The theoretical model presented hereafter draws extensively from this literature. 
In particular, it is an extension of a baseline model presented in Caruso (2008) and 
Caruso (2009). It considers an economy characterized by two sectors. In a first sector - 
the uncontested sector - each party holds secure property rights over the production of 
some goods. In the second sector- the contested sector - agents fight in order to 
appropriate the maximum possible fraction of a contestable output. Security of property 
rights in the uncontested sector need not to be established by means of an ordinary legal 
mechanism. In a scenario of continuing conflict a property rights system is established 
and enforced by means of brute force. Drawing form reality, this is currently the case of 
warlordism in many regions of the world. Warlordism means that non-state violent 
actors challenge state power and monopoly of violence. This line of reasoning somehow 
recalls the distinction between governance and government as envisioned in Dixit 
(2009).  
 As noted above, the conflict also determines the allocation of available 
resources, the distribution of income and power. With a contested-uncontested 
distinction, it is possible to state that there are at least three possible allocations of 
resources, here termed (i) guns, (ii) butter, and (iii) ice-cream. Butter and guns denote 
the classical trade-off between production and appropriation. Ice-cream denotes all the 
productive activities which are not under threat of appropriation. In other words, ice-
cream denotes all the business activities which are not directly affected by the existence 
of a bloody conflict. Needless to say, the opportunity cost of conflict would be related 
not only to the contested production but also to the production of goods which are not 
subject to appropriation. Production of both goods would eventually also depend on the 
relative price of butter in terms of ice-cream.  
 Among Hirshleifer-style models there are few studies which address directly the 
impact of prices of contested stake upon the intensity and dynamic of conflict. 
Following insights emerging from literature on civil wars, Garfinkel, Skaperdas and 
Syropoulos (2008) model conflict over a tradable natural resource [say Oil] whose 
exploitation is contested by different domestic groups. In particular, the authors model 
and compare autarky and free trade scenarios in order to analyze the impact of conflict 
                                                 
1
 In the eyes of the economist such a paradox could explain why individuals, who live under the 
subsistence level and have almost „nothing to lose‟ from conflict, more readily take part in bloody 
conflict – i.e. the opportunity cost is very low. 
2
In more recent years several studies extended Hirshleifer basic model. See among others, Grossman 
(1991), Skaperdas (1992), Grossman and Kim (1995), Skaperdas and Syropoulos (1996), Neary (1997), 
Anderton et al.(1999), Noh (1999), Genicot and Skaperdas (1992), Baker (2003), Bös and Kolmar (2003), 
Garfinkel (2004), Dixit (2004), Alesina and Spolaore (2005), Maxwell and Reuveny (2005), Caruso 
(2006/2007/2010), Hausken (2004/2006), Munster (2007), Garfinkel, Skaperdas and Syropoulos (2008), 
Munster and Staal (2011), De Luca and Sekeris (2011).   
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and international prices on domestic welfare. Under free trade for a wide range of 
prices, an increase of international price of the contested resource fuels conflict. The 
most interesting result is the reverse of the comparative advantage. That is, in the 
absence of conflict the country would be a net importer of Oil whereas domestic 
conflict implies that the country becomes a net exporter. Productive structure of 
countries is shaped by conflict.  
 In the second part of the paper eventually I present an empirical application to 
the emergence of civil wars in Sub-Saharan Africa for the period 1995-2006. The 
empirical study is based upon the testable implications developed by means of the 
theoretical model. On civil wars, there is a widespread agreement that the incidence of 
civil wars is positively associated with the abundance of natural resources. This is also 
studied as „resource curse‟. In fact, in many territories, the government and various 
warlords or rebel groups compete over the appropriation of rents flourishing from 
exploitation of natural resources
3
. 
 As a first enrichment to the existing literature the current paper does constitute 
an attempt to analyse punctually the association between the world price of 
commodities and the incidence of actual conflicts. In fact, within a large empirical 
literature on economics causes of civil wars, there are few studies which focus 
punctually on relationship and causality between actual conflicts and commodity prices. 
Besley and Persson (2008) show how both export and import price indexes for 
commodities are positively and significantly correlated with the incidence of civil war. 
In particular, disentangling agricultural and minerals, the authors found that agricultural 
export and import prices are positively and significantly associated with the incidence 
of a civil war. Instead, only mineral import prices are significantly and positively 
associated with the incidence of a civil war whereas the mineral price index shows no 
significant correlation. Interestingly, there is no significant association between oil 
export price and the incidence of a civil war. Bruckner and Ciccone (2010) found that 
there is a significant negative association between international commodity prices and 
the onset of civil wars. In particular, the authors show that civil war onset in year t is 
negatively associated with the growth of international commodity prices over the 3 
previous years. The authors apply the ordinary least squares as method of estimation. 
The latter point is perhaps the main shortcoming of the analysis given that the 
dependent variable is dichotomous. Angrist and Kugler (2008) study the relationship 
between coca prices, income and civil conflict in Colombia. In particular, the authors 
analyse the impact of the consequences of an abrupt rise in coca prices upon violence. 
The empirical strategy is a logit estimation whose dependent variable is the ratio of 
violent deaths upon the population. The findings show increased violent death rates 
after the increase in coca cultivation associated with a rise in price of Colombian coca. 
Another interesting paper is about Columbian conflict, is by Dube and Vargas (2007) 
that explore how international commodity prices shocks affect armed conflict in 
Colombia. The authors found that exogenous price shocks in the coffee and oil markets 
have significant effects on armed conflict in Colombia. A severe fall in coffee prices in 
the late 1990s increased dramatically the level of violence in coffee-intensive 
municipalities, by lowering wages and therefore the opportunity cost of recruitment into 
armed groups. By contrast, a rise in oil prices increased conflict in the oil region, by 
                                                 
3
See among others: Collier and Hoeffler (1998/2000/2004), Le Billon (2001a), De Soysa (2002), 
Sambanis (2001/2002), Bannon and Collier (2003), Fearon and Laitin (2003), Fearon (2005), Humphreys 
(2005), Lujala et al. (2005), De Soysa and Neumayer (2007), Collier and Rohner (2008), Caruso (2009).  
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raising potential gains from its exploitation. That is, the higher the oil world price the 
higher is the bloody rent-seeking associated with it.  
 Therefore, the present work also contributes also to this growing empirical 
literature by analysing the relationship between the international commodity prices and 
the incidence of a civil war. In particular, there is a significant novel contribution to the 
literature. In fact, drawing from the theoretical model of the previous section, the 
analysis focuses not only on the commodity prices but rather on the relative price of 
commodities in terms of manufactures. In fact, the implicit assumption of studies which 
focus only on commodity prices is that economies descending into bloody conflicts are 
dependent upon primary sectors. Albeit true in many cases, some remarks should be 
produced. The existence of small manufacturing sectors, for example, can dramatically 
affect the opportunity cost of conflict for individuals. Needless to say, the expected 
return of productive activities in manufacturing sectors would depend also upon prices 
of manufactured goods. Simple to say that the world price of manufactured goods may 
can be predicted to affect the likelihood of a bloody civil war. This is particularly 
crucial nowadays when the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis of persistent decline in LDCs‟ 
terms of trade appears to be challenged by the sharp increase of commodity prices 
occurred in the latest years. In fact, the copious literature about commodity prices and 
growth in LDCs needs to be enriched by analysing this new current trend. This is 
particularly significant when considering that most low-income African countries 
depend on primary commodities for the larger share of their exports
4
.   
 Finally the paper is structured as follows. In a first section a formal model is 
expounded. In a second section, in order to highlight some fundamental features of the 
analytical model a numerical example is presented. Eventually, on the basis of the 
theoretical analysis, an empirical application to the emergence of civil wars in Sub-
Saharan Africa is presented. Conclusions summarise the results.  
 
 
2. A BASIC MODEL OF CONFLICT AND PRODUCTION  
 
There are two conflicting risk-neutral behaving units indexed by      . These 
conflicting behaving units can be interpreted alternatively as countries, regions, or 
communities. For sake of simplicity in the continuation of the work I shall refer to them 
as „regions‟. They are assumed to be unitary actors. They both produce two tradable 
goods (butter and ice-cream) which are to be sold to the rest of the world (ROW). That 
is, the world is made of region 1, region 2 and the rest of the world. Both regions have a 
positive resources endowment denoted by                . The positive resources 
endowment can be divided into „guns‟, „butter‟ and „ice-cream‟. By „guns‟ I indicate 
any positive investments in unproductive activities of fighting. By „butter‟ I indicate any 
positive investment in productive activities in the contested sector, whilst by „ice-
cream‟ I indicate any positive investments in productive activities in the uncontested 
sector
5
. In fact, given the continuing conflict, the two regions also allocate a fraction of 
their resources endowment to unproductive activities of fighting (for appropriation). In 
particular, it is also assumed that only one between the two goods produced (say the 
                                                 
4
 On the relation between commodity prices and economic development see Deaton (1999) and Deaton 
(2010).  
5
 For a discussion on the distinction between contested and uncontested sectors please refer to Caruso 
(2009).  
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butter) is contested, namely subject to appropriation. Instead uncontested production of 
ice-cream is secure from appropriation. Henceforth, I also shall refer to them as 
„contested‟ and „uncontested‟ sectors respectively. For sake of simplicity, henceforth I 
shall use indistinguishably butter, guns and ice-cream to indicate both input and output 
of production processes. The two conflicting regions interact simultaneously. The 
interaction between the two regions generates a Nash-equilibrium allocation of 
resources endowment to „guns‟, „butter‟ and „ice-cream‟. The timing of such interaction 
is as follows: 
 
1) in the first stage, agents observe an exogenous price for both butter and ice-
cream.  
2) agents move simultaneously and choose an optimal level of guns and ice cream. 
The supply of both butter and guns is determined;  
3) Market clears and new prices for butter and ice-cream are assigned.  
4) Payoffs are assigned, final incomes are attained and the final outcome of the 
regions is realised.   
 
To summarise formally it is possible to write the resources constraint as: 
 
                  
 
where    denotes the level of „guns‟, and   and   denote „ice-cream‟ and „butter‟ 
respectively. They are all assumed to be positive:                       
           . In the contested sector, the contested joint product – indicated by   - 
can be described as a simple linear additive function: 
      
                        
 
Where         . This aggregate production function is characterized by constant 
returns to scale and constant elasticity of substitution. The outcome of the struggle is 
determined by means of an ordinary Contest Success Function
6
 (henceforth CSF for 
brevity) in its ratio form: 
 
 
          
  
       
       
 
The functional form adopted for CSF is a special case of the general ratio form of CSF, 
    
      
      
                   which is extensively adopted in literature. 
Whenever    , it could be said that the CSF does exhibit decreasing returns in the 
technology of conflict. Whenever    , the CSF exhibits increasing returns to fighting. 
With     it could be said the CSF exhibits constant returns to fighting. In our context, 
firstly regions are assumed to be identical in their fighting abilities          . 
                                                 
6Selective seminal contributions on CSF are by Tullock (1980), O‟Keeffe et al. (1984), Rosen (1986), 
Dixit (1987) and Hirshleifer (1989). See then Skaperdas (1996) and Clark and Riis (1998) for a basic 
axiomatization. See also Amegashie (2006) and Peng (2006). 
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Moreover, the parameter   is set to unity. Such assumption appears to be particularly 
fitting in our context.  
 At the same time, the functional form of CSF adopted is also crucial with regard 
to the positivity assumption for guns. In fact, the ratio form of the CSF implies that if 
one of the two contestants does not allocate any resource to „guns‟, the other party does 
appropriate all the contested output, namely                     . Then, either 
party would be likely to defect and invest any small positive magnitude in order to raise 
its fraction of the aggregate output from 50% to 100%, in order to appropriate all the 
joint contested output
7
 defined by (2). Thus, if one region chooses not to invest in 
„guns‟, it will receive a zero payoff, while player 2 will receive the payoff full and 
viceversa. If „peace‟ can be defined as the condition in which        , peace can 
never occur as an equilibrium under the ratio form of CSF. This is confirmed in Neary 
(1997b) that states “as long as a player cannot physically exclude her consumption 
expenditure from being part of the overall prize, this expenditure is at risk of loss to the 
other players, and the player is, however unwillingly, a part of the game”8 That is, 
given the ratio form adopted for CSF, the positivity assumption for guns does capture 
the coerced participation in the conflict. The Contest Success Function is differentiable 
and follows the conditions below: 
 
 
 
 
  
 
      
 
            
  
 
                  
   
 
            
  
 
       
  
 
and then the outcome in the contested sector is given by: 
 
               
 
The uncontested sector is modelled as a traditional sector exhibiting decreasing returns 
to scale. Therefore, the production function is a standard intensive production function 
which exhibits decreasing returns to scale: 
 
         
           
  
 
where    denotes the level of resources devoted to the uncontested production by region 
  and         is the parameter capturing the degree of returns of scale. Regions are 
assumed to be equally productive. Final income of each region can be described as: 
 
                       
 
                                                 
7
 Hirshleifer (1989, p. 105) also notes that the contested „prize‟ must be larger than zero. “ Then , 
assuming only that     [where   is the value of the prize], under the Cournot assumption either player 
would be motivated to defect, since even the smallest finite commitment of resources makes the defector‟s 
relative success jump from 50% to 100%.”. 
8
 Neary (1997b) p. 378 
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With              denoting the initial relative price of butter in terms of ice-cream. A 
critical assumption is that countries in the first stage observe initial exogenous prices 
 iceb pp ,  which are independent of the policies chosen.  
 Regions are assumed to be rational and to interact simultaneously à la Nash-
Cournot. Therefore, treating the opponent‟s choice as given each region   maximizes (6) 
with respect to    and   . Under an ordinary process of maximization the Nash 
equilibrium choices of „ice-cream‟ are: 
 
     
    
   
 
  
 
       
 
It is clear that 0/
*  pyi . Evidently, the higher is the initial relative price of butter in 
terms of ice-cream, the smaller will be the production of ice-cream. In particular, it is 
also interesting that the supply of ice-cream increases in the degree of productivity only 
in the presence of a combination of   and  , 
)/(*
/
1120  si sepsy . That is, when   is 
high enough, it can dominate the positive impact on production emerging in the 
presence of an adequate degree of productivity. The level of guns in equilibrium is 
given by: 
 
  
    
     
  
 
          
 
 
 
       
 
 
Clearly the optimal level of guns is increasing in the initial relative price of butter in 
terms of ice-cream, namely                   . Eventually, the level of butter 
is given by: 
 
  
       
    
                
                    
 
  
       
    
                                     
 
Where    
       and    
      . That is, reasonably the quantity of butter is 
increasing in the initial relative price of butter in terms of ice-cream. Evidently, given 
that      
    
  and      
    
 , hence   
    
        .  
 
*** 
At this point, the interlinking interaction of conflict and production determined the level 
of production for both tradable goods made of butter and ice-cream. The rest of the 
world purchases the total supply of butter and ice cream. Let me assume that the 
preferences of the rest of the world take the classical Cobb-Douglas form: 
 
                         
   
 
  
 
          
 
where                      . The rest of the world maximizes its utility under the 
constraint:  
 
    
 
   , where        9. The demand for the different 
commodities is                     . The supply of the different commodities 
                                                 
9
Reasonably, another assumption would be TRm   
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is nothing but the equilibrium quantities chosen in the first stage, namely 
   
    
   
 
   
 
  . The market clearing equations are given by: 
 
  
  
    
    
      
  
  
   
 
   
 
      
 
Eventually the final prices of butter and ice-cream are respectively denoted by  
 
 and 
 
 
: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
        
                       
 
 
 
 
                
 
 
         
 
Please note that  
 
                            , and  
 
  . The price of 
butter is decreasing in the initial relative price only in the presence of specific 
combinations of      and  . That is,          if and only if   
             
                                      .  
This is somehow counterintuitive. That is, since the quantity of butter is 
increasing in the initial relative price of butter in terms of ice-cream, it ought to be 
expected that the price of butter would be decreasing in the initial relative price of butter 
in terms of ice-cream. The latter inequality shows that this is not always the case. There 
could be combinations of     and    which make the price of butter increasing in the 
initial relative price of butter in terms of ice-cream. However, as the resources 
endowment increases, the inequality holds. In fact, this inequality unambiguously holds 
if     . In addition the price of butter is increasing in the degree of productivity.  
Contrariwise, the final price of ice-cream is unambiguously increasing in the 
initial relative price   
 
      , but it is decreasing in the degree of productivity 
   
 
      if and only if               . That is, the allocation of resources to 
ice-cream favours a larger supply of the uncontested commodity so inducing a decrease 
of price. However, whenever   and   are sufficiently high the price of ice cream is no 
longer decreasing in the degree of productivity. In particular, this confirms what found 
above, namely that when   is sufficiently high, even a superior productivity in the 
uncontested sector is „dominated‟ by profitability if the contested sector.  Eventually 
final incomes of both regions are given by: 
 
  
    
           
 
  
 
 
    
   
 
 
 
Final incomes are increasing in the aggregate positive endowment of resources. 
Eventually final income of both regions increases in the degree of productivity if and 
only if       . That is, final income of both regions is increasing in the degree of 
productivity of uncontested production if and only if it dominates the incentive for 
fighting proxied by  .  
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3. Empirical Implications 
 
The theoretical analysis suggested that the relative price of commodities of contested 
sectors in terms of goods produced in the uncontested sector has a role in explaining the 
intensity of destructive investments (proxied by the level of guns) undertaken by a 
rational actor. Broadly stated, the opportunity cost of conflict also depends on relative 
profitability of contested and uncontested production. Needless to say, profitability of 
uncontested production must be associated with the final market demand and selling 
prices of goods. Hereafter I try an empirical application focused on Sub-Saharan Africa 
for the period 1995-2006. As noted above in the introductory section of this paper, there 
is an established literature which uncovered the relationship between the exploitation of 
primary commodities and the incidence of civil wars. At the same time, echoing the 
theoretical section, in some cases manufacturing presumably can be assumed to 
constitute the portion of economic activity which can be modeled as ice-cream, namely 
as uncontested production. Clearly, choices of producers of contested commodities 
reflect world prices. In fact, the producers are likely to supply more when the prices are 
high in order to increase expected revenues.  
 Therefore, a reasonable empirical application must consider the ratio between a 
commodity price index and a manufactures price index. Such ratio has been extensively 
used in literature which focused on terms of trade, prices of primary commodities and 
the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis. The figures below report the monthly indices for total 
commodity, nonfuel commodities and oil for the period 1994-2007.  It is clear that since 
2002 commodity markets have experienced an unprecedented boom. 
 
FIGURE 1 – COMMODITY PRICE INDEX – MONTHLY PRICE – SOURCE: IMF 
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FIGURE 2 – CRUDE OIL PRICE INDEX – MONTHLY PRICE – SOURCE: IMF 
 
FIGURE 3 – COMMODITY NONFUEL PRICE INDEX – MONTHLY PRICE – SOURCE: IMF 
 
 
FIGURE 4 – COMMODITY METALS PRICE INDEX – MONTHLY PRICE – SOURCE: IMF 
 
There are no available data on prices of manufactures of Africa countries. Therefore, the 
manufactures price index adopted is the Manufactures Unit Value Index (henceforth 
MUV). It is a trade-weighted index of the five major developed countries‟ (France, 
Germany, Japan, United Kingdom, and United States) exports of manufactured goods to 
developing countries. The MUV is the only readily available trade-based manufacturing 
price measure available over a long time horizon. In fact, it has been commonly used as 
a measure of developing country imports. Its use in the present context is based on the 
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rather strong assumption that G-5 manufacturing exports can be considered as a 
representative benchmark for the manufacturing exports of the rest of the world, 
especially of developing countries. In particular, the MUV can be considered 
representative for world price of manufactures. This assumption can be reasonable 
when considering that (i) economic integration occurred in the latest years induced also 
a convergence of prices of like goods; (ii) the „geography of trade‟ has been re-shaping 
in the latest fifteen years. First, according to UNCTAD, developing countries‟ 
participation in world trade has increased up to 36% in 2005. Secondly a dramatic 
increase of South-South also trade took place.  
 In the latest years, in particular, the rising weight of China in world trade of 
manufactures which put a remarkable pressure on international prices towards 
convergence. Shortly, China's rapid technological progress, low labour costs and 
economies of scale are putting a downward pressure on prices of manufactured goods. 
For example Kaplinsky (2006) explains that within a significant number of product 
groups, the prices of products exported into the EU by China and low-income 
economies was more likely to decline than the prices of the same products-groupings 
sourced from other high-income economies. This is because of the intense competition 
between China and low-income countries. Villoria (2009) also finds, that China has 
significantly decreased
 
world prices in major markets for manufactures, especially 
textiles,
 
wearing apparel and footwear, potentially displacing the clothing
 
exports of 
African countries. As a consequence
 
of China's export growth, less-developed countries 
have also experienced substantial reductions in both their import and exports prices 
across all manufacturing
 sectors. Fu, Kaplinsky and Zhang (2009) show that China‟s 
exports have influenced not only prices of low-skilled and labour-intensive exporters 
but also prices of  exports originating from high and middle-income countries.  That is, 
under the emerging convergence of world prices for many categories manufactures, I 
henceforth assume that the MUV index can be used as world price of manufactures 
index. Figure 5 reports the MUV from 1960 to 2008. The increase of MUV in the latest 
years is explained by means of dollar depreciation.  
 
FIGURE 5 – MANUFACTURES UNIT VALUE INDEX (MUV), 1990=100. U.S. DOLLAR TERMS 
 
 
*** 
Hence, I created a panel dataset for the occurrence of civil wars in Sub-Saharan Africa 
which spans from 1995 to 2006. Eventually I estimate the following random effects 
panel probit model:  
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The incidence of a civil war has been captured through a dummy variable (        ) 
which takes the value of unity in the presence of a civil war in country   at time   and 
zero otherwise. Data about civil wars have been drawn from UCDP/Prio Armed 
Conflict Database
10
.The commodities indexes considered are alternatively: (i) an 
aggregate commodity index; (ii) an Oil price index; (iii) the Commodity Nonfuel Price 
Index; (iv) a metals price index. Source of these indexes is the IMF database. In 
particular, annual averages have been computed on the basis of monthly averages. The 
MUV index is available on the World Bank website
11
. I use lagged values for all 
indexes mentioned above. The expected signs for the coefficients of commodity prices 
and MUV are positive and negative respectively.  
 First, parsimonious models have been estimated. In further estimations a set of 
control variables has been also added. Many of them are drawn from existing literature 
on civil conflict. In particular, I am including: density of population, ethnic 
fractionalization and polarization, forest area in the country, the polity score and a 
dummy variable capturing the colonial legacy, and finally whether a country is 
landlocked or not. Data about forest areas have been extracted by FAO‟s Global Forest 
resources Assessment 2005. Data for density of population per square km have been 
extracted from U.S. Census Bureau International Database. Indexes of ethnic 
fractionalization and polarization are from Montalvo and Reynal Queirol (2005)
 12
. The 
institutional regime has been captured through the polity index as developed in Polity 
IV project, Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2006. This index is 
bounded between -10 and 10 where 10 means perfect democracy. In order to evaluate 
the social well-being I use the Human Development Index (henceforth HDI for sake of 
brevity) produced by United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) since 1990. 
The HDI combines three basic dimensions of human life: (1) life expectancy at birth; 
(2) education; (3) standard of living measured by GDP per capita. Given its nature, it 
could be considered a good approximation of a broader socio-economic environment. In 
particular, I use only the HDI computed in 1995. This would capture the initial 
conditions at the beginning of the period considered. Needless to say, since the HDI 
index depends also upon literacy, they have not been included in the same regressions.  
 
TABLE 1. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Variable Source Obs Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
War (dummy) PRIO/UCDP 480 0.28 0.44 0 1 
Commodity Price Index 
(logged) IMF 480 4.13 .19 37.8 4.61 
Oil Price Index (logged) IMF 480 3.89 .45 3.20 4.79 
Nonfuel commodity index IMF 480 4.48 .11 4.33 4.61 
MUV (logged) World Bank 480 4.63 0.07 4.53 4.76 
Agriculture % (logged) UNCTAD 480 3.18 0.81 0.86 5 
Mining % (logged) UNCTAD 468 1.65 1.32 -0.99 4 
Manufacturing % (logged) UNCTAD 480 2.15 0.7 -2 4 
                                                 
10
 The dataset is available at http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Armed-Conflict/UCDP-PRIO/ [accessed 
on January 2009]. The dataset is described in Gleditsch et al. (2002) 
11
 The MUV is available at http://go.worldbank.org/VDQ5AA3VP0 [accessed on december 2009].  
12
Data on ethnic and religious fractionalization and polarization are available at 
http://www.econ.upf.edu/~reynal/data_web.htm [accessed on december 2009].  
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polity2 Polity 480 0.2 5.04 -9 9 
HDI1995 UNDP 408 .47 .11 .30 .75 
Forest (logged) FAO 480 8.6 1.88 2 1 
Density of Population 
(logged)  U.S. Census 480 3.36 1.23 0.69 6 
Ethnic Polarization Reynal- Queirol 432 0.56 0.15 0.27 0.84 
Ethnic Fractionalization Reynal- Queirol 432 0.68 0.22 0.18 0.96 
 
The results as presented in table 2 are somehow puzzled. First, the most interesting and 
robust result is that the MUV index is statistically significant in all specifications (with 
the exception of column 12 specification). Most coefficients are significant at either the 
1% or 5%. Namely a higher international price index for manufactures is associated 
with a lower probability of a civil war. In all specifications this finding is robust. By 
contrast there is no robust evidence about an association between commodity prices and 
the probability of a civil war. For example, the Oil index only appears to be 
significantly associated with the incidence of a civil war. However, such association 
appears to be only weakly significant in only two specifications. The general 
commodity price index is highly significant only in column (6). The metal price and the 
nonfuel commodities index are never statistically significant. In the meantime, the 
coefficients of covariates have the expected signs and precisely: (a) literacy, Polity and 
HDI are negatively associated with the likelihood of a civil war; (b) density of 
population, being landlocked and the size of forested territory are positively associated 
with the incidence of a civil war.  
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Table 2 - Probit  Analysis for the incidence of Civil War 
          
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
Commodity Price 
Index (t-1)     .32 1.94*** .41        
     (.55) (.76) (.56)        
OIL price index (t-
1) -.01 .54* .32 .45*           
 (.22) (.31) (.25) (.27)           
nonfuel price index 
(t-1)           1.58 .27 .76 1.79 
           (1.77) (1.36) (1.41) (1.32) 
metals price index 
(t-1)        .95 .92 1.32     
        (.75) (.76) (.89)     
MUV (t-1) -2.98** -5.09*** -3.84** -4.54 -3.32** -7.04*** -3.55** -4.85*** -4.91*** -6.99*** -6.37** -3.29 -4.08* -5.37*** 
 (1.50) (2.18) (1.76) (1.80) (1.59) (2.38) (1.65) (2.11) (2.12) (2.65) (3.07) (2.35) (2.42) (2.31) 
HDI1995  -10.99***    -20.52***    -10.14*** -15.01**    
  (3.40)    (4.26)    (2.33) (3.33)    
Literacy   -1.23*** -.24           
   (.29) (.24)           
Polity  -0.09** -.11*** -.16***  -0.08*** -.11***  -.10 -0.07*** -.07 -10*** -0.05*  
  (0.05) (0.03) (0.03)  (0.04) (0.03)  (0.03) (.03) (0.04) (.03) (0.03)  
Density of 
Population  .20 .61 -.08  -.24 .57***  -0.07 .25** .84***  -.20  
  (.24) (.13) (.11)  (.23) (.13)  (.11) (.12) (.23)  (.13)  
Ethpol  -1.20 -1.50   -6.02***     2.21  -1.84*  
  (2.18) (1.09)   (2.50)     (1.59)  (1.08)  
Ethfrac  .99  1.62  -.90     -2.71*  -.56  
  (1.87)  (1.00)  (1.45)     (1.54)  (.79)  
Forest area  .002 .57*** -.21*  .33**   .02 0.08 .52***  .26***  
  (.20) (.11) (.12)  (.15)   (.07) (0.09) (.18)  (.11)  
Landlocked  .05    -.73   .25 -.19 .33  .89**  
  (.74)    (.58)   (.25) (.44) (.58)  (.30)  
 1
7 
Const 12.51** 25.21** 14.25* 19.09*** 12.7** 35.46*** 12.14* 17.15** 17.05 27.55 19.90**  13.74 15.46** 
 6.87 (10.73) (8.17) (8.19) (6.88) 11.31 (7.08) (7.83) (7.94) (10.30) (10.20)  (7.61) (7.24) 
               
Obs. 480 360 408 408 480 360 480 480 480 408 360  432 480 
Groups 41 30 34 34 41 30 41 41 41 35 30  36 41 
Log Likelihood -149.68 -89.92 -119.73 -118.93 -149.51 -86.47 -148.25 -148.88 -145.33 -99.38 -88.34  -134.76 -148.75 
Wald 4.08 42.12 49.61 26.25 4.39 49.79 41.79 5.58 19.56 41.00 48.03  22.36 5.83 
LR 265.83 94.83 187.54 186.20 266.17 100.57 244.00 267.08 224.64 135.13 100.67   205.95 267.18 
Notes: standard errors in parenthesis, p-values in square brackets, * **significant at 1%, ** significant al 5%, *significant at 10%. For sake of readability statistically 
significant coefficients are in bold. 
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Therefore, the evidence on the impact of commodity prices on actual civil conflict is not 
conclusive. One possible explanation for such weak evidence is that composition of 
exports is different from one country to another. Hence, aggregate price indexes 
supposed to apply to all countries can be interpreted as inappropriate. In this respect, it 
must be not surprising that crude oil price index performs better than other indexes.  
 By contrast, evidence about MUV is very robust and partly confirms the root 
idea of this work. Namely, it is not only the price of primary commodities which 
affected the incidence of actual conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa but the relative price of 
commodities in terms of manufactures. In particular, this also recalls and complements 
the evidence presented in Caruso (2010) that shows a robust negative correlation 
between the size of manufacturing sector and the incidence of a civil war. Namely the 
higher is the ratio of manufacturing activities in GDP the lower is the probability of 
occurrence of a civil conflict.  
 Hence, table 3 reports the results of further regressions which focus only on the 
relationship between civil war, MUV and size of manufacturing sector. As explanatory 
variables I added the size of manufacturing sector expressed as percentage of GDP and 
eventually an interaction term between the manufacturing sector and MUV. Results are 
as expected. First, there is robust negative association between the likelihood of a civil 
war and the size of manufacturing sector. Secondly, there is robust negative association 
between the likelihood of a civil war and the MUV. In other words, if drawing a causal 
relationship, an increase in world prices of manufactures would make civil wars less 
likely.  
 
Table 3 - Probit and Logit Analysis for the incidence of Civil War 
  Probit Logit 
 (1)# (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Manufacturing -.67*** -1.65***  -.82*** -3.51***  
 (.23) (.32)  (.29) (.66)  
MUV  -3.42*** -4.14***  -5.37** -8.99***  
 (1.55) (1.81)  (2.68) (3.43)  
Manufacturing × MUV   .12***   .24*** 
   (0.04)   (0.07) 
Literacy  -.02*** -0.05***  -.05*** -.12*** 
  (.01) (.01)  (.01) (0.02) 
Polity  -.13*** -.10***  -.30*** -.21*** 
  (.03) (0.03)  (.07) (0.06) 
Density of Population  .88*** .06  1.82*** .69*** 
  (.18) (.12)  (.40) (.26) 
Ethpol  -1.27 -4.80***  -2.89 -1.18 
  (1.12) (1.43)  (2.16) (2.13) 
Forest area  .29*** .23***  .89*** -.16 
  (0.10) (0.08)  (.23) (.18) 
Landlocked  1.36*** .96***  2.91*** 2.53*** 
  (.36) (.31)  (.70) (.66) 
Const 15.91** 17.71** 1.23 23.75** 36.34*** .25 
 (7.22) (8.53) (1.46) (12.45) (16.13) (3.04) 
 [0.03] [0.04] [0.40] [0.06] [0.02] [.94] 
Obs. 480 408 396 480 408 396 
Groups 41 34 33 41 34 33 
Log Likelihood -146.26 -111.88 -119.22 -146.16 -110.26 -114.75 
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Wald 12.17 55.75 34.31 11.24 47.34 (40.55) 
LR 254.81 140.83 165.52 255.6 140.75 174.44 
Notes: standard errors in parenthesis, * **significant at 1%, ** significant al 5%, *significant at 
10%. For sake of readability statistically significant coefficients are in bold.# To increase accuracy 
the number of points  for Gauss-Hermite quadrature has been set to 24. 
 
Eventually, it is possible to test directly the impact of both commodities prices and 
manufactures prices on GDP per capita growth. The GDP per capita growth rate has 
been extracted from Unctad dataset. As explanatory variables, I use the same variables 
of the previous section. The expected signs for the coefficients of commodity prices and 
MUV are negative and positive respectively.  
 
Table 4 - GDP growth and MUV  - OLS fixed effects - Dependent variable GDP growth 
    FE FE FE FE FE FE FE 
Commodity Price Index (t-1) .002 
   
.005 
  
  
(.003) 
   
(.005) 
  OIL price index (t-1) 
 
-.0000 
   
.202 
 
   
(.098) 
   
(.220) 
 nonfuel price index (t-1) 
 
.630 
    
    
(.591) 
    metals price index (t-1) 
   
.110 
  
.178 
     
(.330) 
  
(.357) 
MUV (t-1) 
 
2.01*** 2.13*** 1.32 1.919** 1.676** 1.742** 1.893** 
  
(.721) (.687) (1.018) (.931) (.875) (.900) (1.021) 
Literacy 
     
.009 .010 .010 
      
(.025) (.025) (.0251) 
Polity 
     
-.007 -.008 -.007 
            (.022) (.0217) (.022) 
Density of Population 
    
-.971 -1.266 -.466 
      
(.795) (1.140) (.615) 
Forest area 
     
-.221 -.199 -.211 
            (.228) (.228) (.229) 
Const 
 
-7.98*** -8.44*** -7.49*** -7.192** -2.023 -1.994 -5.24 
  
(3.27) (3.14) (3.249) (3.507) (6.089) (6.752) (5.27) 
         Obs. 
 
424 424 424 424 393 393 393 
Groups 
 
41 41 41 41 38 38 38 
Rsquared within .0261 .0255 .0284 .0258 .0393 .0382 .0366 
Rsquared within .0214 .0177 .0410 .0196 .0001 .0008 .0041 
Rsquared within .0115 .0110 .0118 .0112 .0012 .0016 .002 
Notes: standard errors in parenthesis,  * **significant at 1%, ** significant al 5%, *significant at 10%. For 
sake of readability statistically significant coefficients are in bold.  
 
Even in this case, the results are not fully conclusive. First and foremost, there is a clear 
positive association between the MUV  (one year lagged)  and the gdp per capita growth 
rate. More in detail, ceteris paribus, a 1% increase in MUV is associated with an 
increase in GDP per capita growth rate of 2% approximately. Instead, there is no 
significant association between the GDP per capita growth rate and commodities prices 
indexes. This is in line with the previous results.   
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4. Concluding remarks.  
 
This paper was an attempt to examine the impact of international relative price between 
commodities and manufactured goods on the probability of actual civil conflicts and 
eventually on economic development in Sub-Saharan Africa. The paper presents first a 
theoretical enrichment of economic analysis of conflict and eventually an empirical 
section focused on sub-saharan Africa for the period 1995-2006. Differently from 
existing work, modelled economies are interpreted as being divided into contested and 
uncontested productions. Briefly, a two-sector economy for two risk-neutral agents is 
presented. In a contested sector the two agents struggle to appropriate the maximum 
possible fraction of a contestable output. In an uncontested sector, they hold secure 
property rights over the production of some goods. Agents split their resource 
endowment between „butter‟, „guns‟ and „ice-cream‟. The latter denote productive 
activities secure from appropriation. Needless to say, profitability of uncontested 
production has been associated with the final market demand and selling prices of 
goods. The most interesting result is that productivity of uncontested production and 
profitability of contested sectors appear to behave as countervailing forces. The first 
raises the opportunity cost of being involved in a continuous conflict, whereas the latter 
fuels higher level of unproductive conflict.  
 The empirical section also presents interesting results. They also help also to 
explain why there is a disputable argument about the relationship of commodity prices 
and growth in Sub-Saharan Africa. First, a higher international price index for 
manufactures is associated with a lower probability of a civil war. In all specifications 
this finding is robust. By contrast there is no robust evidence about an association 
between commodity prices and the probability of a civil war. Eventually, there is a clear 
positive association between the MUV index (one year lagged) and the GDP per capita 
growth rate. 
The resulting conclusion seems to be that an increase in world prices of 
manufactures would make civil wars less likely. This appears to be very crucial 
nowadays when the new geography of trade is likely to induce in the next future a 
downward pressure on prices of several categories of manufactures. In many developing 
countries, in the presence of low prices for low-tech manufactures, the relative 
profitability of contested production would increase thereby fuelling the emergence of 
actual conflicts. This also poses an intriguing question in terms of policy prescriptions. 
In fact, enhancing protectionism to raise prices of manufactures would also build 
systems of rents which may be even counterproductive by fuelling other conflicts. 
Therefore, the question is open and this work is nothing but an intriguing spare part of a 
broader and more complex work.    
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COUNTRIES  
 
EXPORT COMMODITIES* CIVIL WAR 
Angola 
crude oil, diamonds, refined petroleum 
products, coffee, sisal, fish and fish products, 
timber, cotton 
1974-1989, 1995-1997, 1998-
2002, 1075-2006.  
Benin 
cotton, cashews, shea butter, textiles, palm 
products, seafood 
 
Botswana 
diamonds, copper, nickel, soda ash, meat, 
textiles 
 
Burkina Faso cotton, livestock, gold  
Burundi coffee, tea, sugar, cotton, hides 1988-1991, 1993-2005 
Cameroon 
crude oil and petroleum products, lumber, cocoa 
beans, aluminum, coffee, cotton 
 
Central African 
Republic 
diamonds, timber, cotton, coffee, tobacco  
Chad oil, cattle, cotton, gum arabic  
Congo 
petroleum, lumber, plywood, sugar, cocoa, 
coffee, diamonds 
 
Dem.Rep.Congo 
diamonds, gold, copper, cobalt, wood products, 
crude oil, coffee 
1996-1997, 1998-2003 
Equatorial Guinea petroleum, methanol, timber, cocoa  
Eritrea 
livestock, sorghum, textiles, food, small 
manufactures 
2008-ongoing 
Ethiopia 
coffee, qat, gold, leather products, live animals, 
oilseeds 
1974-91 
Gabon crude oil,, timber, manganese, uranium   
Gambia 
peanut products, fish, cotton lint, palm kernels, 
re-exports 
 
Ghana 
gold, cocoa, timber, tuna, bauxite, aluminum, 
manganese ore, diamonds, horticulture 
 
Guinea 
bauxite, alumina, gold, diamonds, coffee, fish, 
agricultural products 
 
Ivory Coast cocoa, coffee, timber, petroleum, cotton, 1999-2000, 2002-2007 
 bananas, pineapples, palm oil, fish 
Kenya 
tea, horticultural products, coffee, petroleum 
products, fish, cement 
 
Lesohto wool and mohair, food and live animals  
Liberia rubber, timber, iron, diamonds, cocoa, coffee 1989-1996, 1999-2003 
Malawi 
tobacco , tea, sugar, cotton, coffee, peanuts, 
wood products, appare 
 
Mali cotton, gold, livestock  
Mauritiana 
iron ore, fish and fish products, gold, copper, 
petroleum 
 
Mozambique 
aluminum, prawns, cashews, cotton, sugar, 
citrus, timber; bulk electricity 
1976-1992 
Namibia 
diamonds, copper, gold, zinc, lead, uranium; 
cattle, processed fish, karakul skins 
 
Niger uranium ore, livestock, cowpeas, onions  
Nigeria 
petroleum and petroleum products 95%, cocoa, 
rubbe 
 
Rwanda coffee, tea, hides, tin ore 1990-1994 
Senegal 
fish, groundnuts (peanuts), petroleum products, 
phosphates, cotton 
 
Sierra Leone diamonds, rutile, cocoa, coffee, fish 1991-2002 
Somalia 
livestock, bananas, hides, fish, charcoal, scrap 
metal 
1991-present 
South Africa 
gold, diamonds, platinum, other metals and 
minerals, machinery and equipment 
 
Sudan 
oil and petroleum products; cotton, sesame, 
livestock, groundnuts, gum arabic, sugar 
1983-2005, 2003-present 
Swaziland 
soft drink concentrates, sugar, wood pulp, cotton 
yarn, refrigerators, citrus and canned fruit 
 
Tanzania gold, coffee, cashew nuts, cotton  
Togo reexports, cotton, phosphates, coffee, cocoa  
Uganda 
coffee, fish and fish products, tea, cotton, 
flowers, horticultural products; gold 
1987-2009 
Zambia 
petroleum products, fertilizer; foodstuffs, 
clothing 
 
Zimbabwe 
platinum, cotton, tobacco, gold, ferroalloys, 
textiles/clothing 
 
Source: *CIA World Fact book [accessed December 2009],  
 
